Incredible
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Would like to point out how there was very little additional LP added to the pool when it was opened. The fees and the MNDE rewards did not attract much liquidity. Solend was the only one who added a large amount to the pool.
So it seems only someone who has their own gauge can truly benefit from MNDE emissions. Once again, it would make more sense to reevaluate the entire liquidity gauge model rather than waste time on singling out specific cases.
Also, one complaint about the pool being closed was that it didn’t spread MNDE to more users. Having Solend deposit so much into the pool and KEEPING the emissions is completely counter to the goal of diversifying MNDE holders.
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very little? it doubled!
Looks like the proposal is already live on tribeca
I wonder if all the drama would be solved if the mnde is distributed to stackers instead of locked
No from me.
- I fundamentally disagree with the notion that mDAO should have the goal of maximizing TVL. (Only if MNDE does not go towards 0, mDAO has a chance to survive.)
- Hence there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the gauge. If anything it helps to alleviate sell pressure.
- The are more broader, strucutal issues in the gauges - MNDE liquidity, mSOL liquidity, and the instant unstake liquidity receive too low of a share. (I would suggest to create a floor & a cap for DOV and Borrow-Lends. Gauges then would determine the relative share between protocols in these clusters.)
- To create a more equal playing field, an argument could be made to re-discuss the introduction of the NFT holder gauge.
- I would also ask the Marinade Team to give an update on Bribing Markets, as I would expect these to change the dynamics fundamentally. If they are ever released…
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by what metrics should mdao measure it’s performance?
agree, yeh it was receiving an ok amount until this past week.
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it’s a fair metric, I think there is probably some nuance with capturing market → long term value accrual. but if you believe purely in just PNL then I would suggest making proposals along those lines, it probably would involve removing gauges as a whole.
But it does differ from the metric I am using to evaluate marinade success so you can see how our actions and opinions might differ.
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Which NFT holder gauge? (Although that’s a topic for a different post)
We are working on delegation, which needs to come first. I’m not sure what the timeline is, as I haven’t been on all the discussions, but we can discuss the bribing after.
For what it’s worth, I’m not sure yet bribing is something Marinade needs to design internally, and may only need to provide a framework for others to bribe holders with their preferred approach - that way delegates or projects could come up with their own schema.
So you want Solend to vote to reduce its own LM rewards and then put itself into a cookie cutter category with every other b/l where it would only compete against other b/l in the gauges versus competing out-of-category against DEXs?
Sounds like an interesting proposal.
By the way, we checked the pool balance of our mSOL-USDC pool and it has never become more imbalanced than 60:40. This means that any extra liquidity deposited beyond our initial $1M for the partnership has, practically speaking, never been used. Put differently, we would have facilitated all the trades that we did with or without the extra liquidity. The ballpark figure for the imbalance that would have had to occur for us to have used the extra liquidity would be 75:25. For reference, our SOL-USDC pool has at times gone to about 80:20.
All this is to reinforce my earlier comments about how the way dynamic fees disincentivize additional liquidity has no negative consequences for mSOL liquidity.
Also, Solend team members often claims that our liquidity cannot be used for liquidations, but if at the time of liquidation our pool has more mSOL than USDC and they needed to liquidate a large amount like $500k, we would likely provide the best price.
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It is clear that Lifinity’s fundamental business model is based on capital efficiency. Excess liquidity harms their business and this has been clear from day one. Why does Solend not simply take their liquidity for MSOL-USDC elsewhere?
If I understand this correctly. The dynamic fees applies to other Lifinity Pools and provide extra income to other LP providers on Lifinity is that?
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Assuming this is true, then they should just close their pools instead of pretending to have them open. Solend may move it’s liquidity elsewhere but it doesn’t change the principled issue, lifinity wants to benefit from the liquidity gauge emissions, without playing by the same rules as everyone else.
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Yes, the LP fee share increased for our 3 other open pools because their liquidity was far below the target liquidity, and LPs receive more fees than they used to after implementing dynamic fees.
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Your rules are imagined, they aren’t laid out anywhere.
I have voted, and suggest everyone does the same instead of quarrelling. The time for discussion is over, and it is time for voting.
Everyone here has their own bags and financial incentives. Hardly anyone with a vocal voice here is arguing for the sake of Marinade DAO as a whole. As someone who didnt know Lifinity, and vaguely heard of Solend before today, please enjoy, my top moments of this argument.
Remember to vote:
#1: Lifinity can justify their change all they want, but the move to Dynamic Fees and specifically targetting the mSOL-USDC pool with a move to 100% protocol takerate is still super dis-ingenious. It doesn’t matter matter if it was planned, it matters if you opened the pool to create fairness, and then hit depositors with this. It looks like Lifinity holders came out to justify and support this, understandably so. Would benefit from 3rd party views on this.
#2: There is an idea that this proposal is about a Goliath (Solend) punching down at David (Lifinity). Ignoring the fact that David won, there is too much outcry (mostly by Lifinity supporters) that Solend is just out to crush Lifinity. I feel that this detracts from the primary conversation, but a funny moment lmao.
#3: Lifinity’s argument: “Solend is attempting to bully Lifinity into submission” while Solend’s argument is “Dynamic fees are amalogous to not opening the pool in the first place”. Interesting that Solend is being targeted by Lifinity on Twitter by Lt Lollipop, under constant attacks by Lifinity supporters in Governance Discord. Fortunately a bright spot in this is Durden’s (somewhat) patient fielding of questions from Lifinity’s side.
Anyways, I am new to mDAO and have briefly read through 16/17 + this. Voted Yes, for the simple matter best put by Gekonn here:
Best of luck everyone.
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You are dead to me 
I do get your point. It’s fair enough for Lifinity to simply say the MSOL-USDC pool is closed, at least for now, until whenever it is they decide they need more liquidity.
Meanwhile, I do think they’re doing the AMM thing differently is good for the entire industry as it allows for some innovation, especially around drowning investors with IL and liquidity-mined tokens.
Have voted in the pool and it would be great to see the outcome, guys. No hate for anyone. Just love. 
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One of the drawbacks of the ve-model is that ve-staker get constantly diluted by the emissions they vote for. Whilst some would argue solving for this would lead to centralization (akin to “compounding”), I think it is key to align governance participants with protocol (mSOL) users, and would open the field for broader retail participation in governance.
How?
- An emission gauge directly to veMNDE holder(“NFT Gauge”), or
- “Boosted farming”, ie people who vote on a gauge receive a greater share of emissions. (Unfortunately Ian never finished this, afaik.)
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