Liquidity mining have not significantly moved TVL throughout the last year
Solana DeFi liquidity is low with major protocols paused: Solend used to host 50% mSOL TVL
What is the expected positive impact of this change?
Reducing the emissions by 75% to level with the “Do not distribute” gauge will allow the gauge voters to revisit the decision what should be incentivized without losing their main objective.
Lower emissions will allow to steer focus towards the upcoming Open Doors program
A counterargument to this is that those voting to return MNDE to the treasury each week likely won’t change their vote, so in practice it will be reduced more than intended. Even if some votes were changed – say only 50% vote to return MNDE to the treasury after this proposal passes – will we then make another proposal to reduce the weekly rate by 50%? I don’t see why not; the exact same logic of the original post would still apply. But obviously this recursive reduction wouldn’t make much sense. The only way to prevent this recursive reduction is to either only have the “return to treasury” voting option, or reduce by 75% and remove the voting option.
Reduced more then intended - maybe, but you can also make a case for the 100% LM can be turned off, if 75% reduction did not decrease TVL. But I agree that voters for Do not distribute should be reached out to so they can revisit their voting preference.
Why not does not strike as a strong reason to create this cascading proposal. Also it can be voted down or not reach a quorum.
“77% of weekly liquidity mining budget is currently allocated to “Do not distribute” gauge”
If the rationale is to cut the emissions by 75% because ~77% of MNDE holders choose the “do not distribute” gauge, why isn’t the vote to reduce LM by 75% and remove the option to “do not distribute” on the LM voting? It would codify those voters top option, by not distributing 75%, and then give them a vote as to where the other amount (current 23%) goes. Also, reducing emissions because holders don’t want to be diluted seems like a questionable rationale when all holders should be aware of the emission schedule; 1M MNDE/week. Deviating from that plan can be seen as early adopters/large holders pulling up the ladder behind them.
So again, what’s the rationale behind this statement? Liquidity is low so rewards should be lowered to match? Does MNDE rewards drive any additional liquidity? There have been liquidity pools that have reduced or lost their MNDE rewards. What happened to liquidity after that occurred?
Lastly, isn’t the main goal of liquidity mining to further decentralize MNDE? We should be discussing whether liquidity mining is helping towards that objective or not.
with Open Doors launching, some voters might prefer to reduce LM even more, but also
LM rate as a parameter might get increased by a proposal despite Open Doors - it’s after all a governable parameter, so the need for gauge might stay
it’s significantly easier to add a gauge than to remove/stop it in Tribeca (old gauges are only hidden, not closed)
That being said, voters should take time to reassess their voting preference when the liquidity get reduced (vote passed, execution is queued and waiting for a minimal 5 days after a successful vote). Marinade should communicate this that on official channels.
Open Doors will likely (hopefully) pull the weight of decentralizing Marinade in 2023, but again, LM rate is a governable param.
I still think it’s weak rationale for such a large change. To go along with that it was proposed by a leader and almost instantly put to a vote. It just reeks of trying to stop the dilution of MNDE while also not willing to discuss whether the LM is working in the ways it is supposed to: Providing liquidity and decentralizing the protocol.
I am not completely against the move it just seems like the rationale should be something like: “MNDE token price has fallen and I think it’s in the best interest of the DAO to hold onto that MNDE for now instead of diluting an undervalued token even further. It’s more valuable to hold onto it to be used other ways in the future.”
Instead the conversation seems to be: LM is a governable param so if people want it cut we should cut it.
I think these are fair observations. Thank you for them.
It is seemingly fast. I would prefer this to take longer, but also internally the team has discussed this for some time. I even mentioned lowering incentives publicly in August. In my mind I treat is as an experiment how will LM influence TVL.
Given reasons are the highlights, but there are contextual reasons that could have been voiced better. Externally, I think there’s not much mSOL use to incentivize in Solana DeFI right now and saving the dry powder for later feels like a smart move. Internally the team is working on redesigning team allocations to follow TVL and other milestones from simple time unlocks, which will improve MNDE emissions. But these are not ready yet and reducing LM was a simple enough piece of the puzzle that could have been shipped instead of waiting for the rest of the changes.
@gekonn I’m sure you have a handle on this already, but I’m sharing in case you are concerned about a greater-than-intended reduction and looking for wallets who have voted on the “Do Not Distribute” gauge recently.
Definitely not a perfect query, but this should give you a good starting point.