[UPDATED]
Abstract
This proposal suggests modifying the fee structure outlined in MIP-5. The updated structure removes the fixed 9.5% performance fee on Marinade products and replaces it with a conditional fee that is charged only when Marinade outperforms the Solana Staking Rate. It also unifies withdrawal fees across Marinade products by setting a 20 bps unstake fee on exits from Marinade Native, mSOL, and Marinade Select.
This change is intended to maximize user yield competitiveness at all times while ensuring that the DAO earns fees only when the protocol demonstrably delivers outperformance versus the chain-wide baseline.
Motivation
Marinade’s main objective is to grow TVL and attract more stakers to its products. We have observed that stakers (whether individuals or institutions) are increasingly sensitive to APY and will choose providers that optimize net returns. While the Stake Auction Marketplace (SAM) is an extremely powerful way to optimize APY for stakers, its effectiveness is significantly reduced when a fixed performance fee is applied regardless of whether Marinade is outperforming.
Having a static fee on top of Marinade makes APY less competitive during periods when rewards are lower, thereby reducing the competitive advantage of SAM compared to delegating to a single strong validator. A fixed fee also creates a mismatch between incentives: users pay continuously, even in periods where Marinade is only matching market rates.
Additionally, while the DAO approved a 9.5% performance fee, SAM mechanics and validator bidding inefficiencies mean Marinade does not consistently capture a full 9.5% share of staking rewards in practice. The current model is therefore “worst of both worlds”: users face a constant fee drag, while the DAO does not reliably earn the intended take rate. A fee model tied to actual value delivery is more aligned for both users and the DAO.
For these reasons, making the performance fee conditional and applying it only when Marinade’s APY exceeds a defined baseline allows Marinade to remain competitive at all times, and ensures that any protocol fee reflects true outperformance.
Solana Staking Rate definition.
The Solana Staking Rate (SSR) is defined as the network-wide staking rewards derived from inflation and transaction fees (including priority fees). MEV is excluded from SSR. SSR therefore represents a neutral chain-native benchmark for staking performance.
User yield parity goal.
The goal of this fee update is to deliver the best yield possible to users, so that staking with Marinade matches or exceeds the effective rate of running or delegating to one’s own best-available validator, while the DAO earns fees only when it objectively provides incremental value over the baseline.
Unifying the unstake fee supports this effort by shifting revenue collection toward exits rather than long-term rewards. A flat 20 bps unstake fee across all products adds a secondary revenue stream that does not penalize long-term stakers and helps offset revenue impact from changing the performance fee to a conditional model.
Proposal
If passed, this proposal would apply the following fee changes:
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Deprecate Marinade’s fixed performance fee.
The 9.5% performance fee currently applied to Marinade Native and mSOL rewards will be removed.
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Introduce a conditional performance fee.
A new performance fee will be charged only when Marinade APY exceeds the Solana Staking Rate.
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Unify the unstake fee across products.
A 20 bps (0.20%) unstake fee will be added to all Marinade products:
- Marinade Native
- mSOL
- Marinade Select
Conclusion
This proposal updates Marinade’s fee model to prioritize user yield competitiveness while aligning DAO revenue with real value delivery. By replacing a fixed performance fee with a conditional one, Marinade remains competitive in all market conditions and only charges when it outperforms the chain-wide baseline. A unified 20 bps unstake fee provides sustainable protocol revenue without reducing long-term staking returns.
Overall, the new structure is designed to help Marinade grow TVL by delivering net yields comparable to (or better than) users’ best alternatives, while ensuring the DAO is compensated fairly for measurable outperformance.